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Social Traps and 
Environmental Policy 
Why do problems persist when there are 
technical solutions available? 
I n recent years scientific under-standing and public awareness of 
environmental problems have in-
creased tremendously. Yet our ability 
to manage these problems effectively 
has in too many cases gotten worse, 
not better. Consider the following 
examples: 
• Thousands of inactive and aban-
doned hazardous waste dumps exist 
in the United States. There are thou-
sands more active sites, plus deep well 
injection sites. These wastes are slow-
ly seeping into drinking water sup-
plies; many of their constituent chem-
icals have totally unknown effects on 
human and environmental health. 
Each year thousands of new chemi-
cals are introduced into the environ-
ment whose effects are equally un-
known. Superfund is only beginning 
to clean up the worst inactive and 
abandoned sites (most of the money 
so far has gone into planning and 
litigation). Handling active sites is 
largely an individual state's responsi-
bility, and resources for this critical 
task are too often insufficient. 
• The coastal zone of Louisiana is 
eroding at a rate of more than 100 
km2/yr, and the rate is accelerating 
(Gagliano et al. 1981). Canal dredg-
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By studying real-world 
social traps and 
laboratory examples, we 
can learn effective escapes 
. ing in the coastal zone has been 
shown to be a significant contributing 
factor to wetland erosion (along with 
sediment diversion resulting from lev-
eeing the Mississippi River and natu-
ral subsidence) (Craig et al. 1979, 
Deegan et al. 1984, Leibowitz et al. 
1987, Scaife et al. 1983). In 1980 the 
state implemented an office of coastal 
zone management to permit canal 
dredging and other activities in the 
coastal zone. Since 1980 there have 
been several thousand canal-dredging 
applications (mainly for the develop-
ment of oil and gas), and the office 
has yet to deny a permit. Some small-
scale projects designed to reverse wet-
land erosion have been implemented 
but have been largely ineffective. The 
state is currently considering several 
options to control the erosion of 
wetland, all of which will be very 
expensive . 
• Probably the biggest environmen-
tal threat facing the world today is the 
threat of nuclear war. The likelihood 
that a nuclear winter will result from 
even a moderate thermonuclear ex-
change has been estimated by some 
researchers to be very high (Turco et 
al. 1983, White and London 1984). 
There is still considerable uncertainty 
about the global environmental ef-
fects of nuclear war. Even in the best-
case scenario the damages would be 
astronomical, and in the worst case 
such an event could drive the human 
species to extinction. It would be cat-
astrophic not only for human life, but 
for most forms of life on the planet 
(Ehrlich et al. 1983). There has, how-
ever, been little real movement to-
ward arms control or other long-term 
solutions. 
This litany could be continued in-
definitely, spanning the spectrum 
from local to global problems (see 
also Borman and Likens, p. 370, and 
Catton, p. 413, this issue). The funda-
mental question is: Why do these 
problems persist in the face of ade-
quate scientific understanding of their 
nature and of technical methods to 
solve them? What do they have in 
common? Can they be solved, and if 
so is there a general category of 
solutions? 
I argue that all the environmental 
problems mentioned above (and 
many other social problems) belong 
to a category of phenomenon called 
social traps (Platt 1973). Like animal 
traps, social traps lead an unwary 
victim into the jaws of disaster with a 
tempting bit of bait, and, once the 
victim is caught, make escape ex-
tremely difficult. By studying the fea-
tures real-world social traps have in 
common, and by experimenting with 
some simple laboratory examples of 
social traps, we can learn more about 
their general nature and the nature of 
effective escapes from them. A broad 
ecological perspective can be effective 
in understanding, avoiding, and es-
caping from some social traps, but it 
must be coupled with effective public 
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Figure 1. Social traps as misleading road signs and some potential solutions. 
policy. Effective policy involves a 
range of activities from education to 
regulation to correcting the mislead-
ing short-term incentives (the bait) 
that create traps in the first place. 
Social traps 
A social trap is any situation in which 
the short-run, local reinforcements 
guiding individual behavior are in-
consistent with the long-run, global 
best interest of the individual and 
society (Cross and Guyer 1980, Platt 
1973, Teger 1980). We go through life 
making decisions about which path to 
take based largely on "road signs," 
the short-run, local reinforcements 
that we perceive most directly. These 
short-run reinforcements can include 
monetary incentives, social accept-
408 
ance or admonishment, and physical 
pleasure or pain. Figure 1a indicates 
the situation. In this figure the "cor-
rect" path (toward happiness and 
prosperity) seems obvious from the 
signs. In general, this strategy of fol-
lowing the road signs is quite effective 
in getting us where we want to go. 
Problems arise, however, when the 
road signs are inaccurate or mislead-
ing. In these cases we can be trapped 
into following a path that is ultimate-
ly detrimental because of our reliance 
on the road signs. For example, ciga-
rette smoking is a social trap because 
by following the short-run road signs 
of the pleasure and social status asso-
ciated with smoking, we embark on 
the road to an increased risk of earlier 
death from smoking-induced cancer. 
More important, once this road has 
been taken it is very difficult to 
change to another (as most people 
who have tried to quit smoking can 
attest) . 
Social traps can result from several 
causes. Table 1 is a taxonomy of these 
causes (Cross and Guyer 1980) along 
with some representative traps associ-
ated with each. Cigarette smoking, 
for example, is mainly a time-delay 
trap resulting from the fact that the 
positive and negative reinforcements 
are separated in time. 
Traps can also arise out of simple 
ignorance of the relevant reinforce-
ments, the change of reinforcements 
with time (sliding reinforcer traps), 
the externalization of some important 
reinforcements from the accounting 
system (externality traps), the actions 
of some individuals affecting the 
group in adverse ways (collective 
traps), or a combination of these 
causes (hybrid traps). These causes 
will be elaborated in the examples 
that follow. 
Social traps are ubiquitous in ev-
eryday life and have become the basis 
for some important social psychology 
research (Brockner and Rubin 1985). 
For example, the "prisoner's dilem-
ma" game is a famous externality 
trap that has been used recently to 
study the conditions under which 
cooperation can evolve (Axelrod 
1984). In this game two players must 
each choose either to cooperate or 
defect. If they both cooperate, they 
both reap a moderate reward (say 
three units each) . If they both defect 
they both get a much smaller reward 
(say one unit each). If one cooperates 
while the other defects, the coopera-
tor gets nothing (the "sucker's pay-
off") while the defector gets a reward 
larger than that for mutual cooper-
ation (say five units). Under these 
conditions, if the players only meet 
once and cannot communicate with 
each other, the optimum strategy is to 
defect. For if one has no information 
about the other player, one must as-
sume the worst to avoid the sucker's 
payoff. The situation changes radical-
ly if the game is played several times 
with the same participants. Then each 
player has the record of their oppo-
nent's past behavior, and the opti-
mum strategy is not obvious. 
Axelrod (1984) held a computer 
tournament pitting various submitted 
strategies against one another in a 
BioScience Vol. 37 No.6 
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round robin tournament of the iterat-
ed prisoner's dilemma. He found that 
a simple strategy called tit for tat, 
which cooperates on the first move, 
then does whatever its opponent did 
last time, won the tournament. In the 
iterated prisoner's dilemma, one can 
fall into the always-defect trap by not 
looking beyond the current move. If a 
strategy is too shortsighted it misses 
the opportunity to reap the benefits of 
mutual cooperation. Tit for tat was 
only a little more farsighted (one 
move) than all defect, but this was 
enough to dramatically improve its 
performance without making it too 
susceptible to being suckered. 
It turns out that there are several 
other strategies that would have won 
the tournament had they been en-
tered. One of these cooperates on the 
first move and then looks at the entire 
past history of its opponent's moves 
to generate a time-weighted expected 
value for the opponent's next move. 
A strategy almost identical to this 
(called downing) was entered but lost 
because it defected on the first two 
moves. In the iterated prisoner's di-
lemma, it pays to assume the best of 
your opponent (at least until you have 
been proven wrong) and to have a 
good memory. 
The tragedy of the commons is 
another well-known social trap used 
to study overexploitation of natural 
resources (Hardin 1968). The classic 
commons trap goes something like 
this. There is a common property 
resource (say grazing land). Each in-
dividual user (rancher) sees his indi-
vidual cost for consuming an addi-
tional unit of the resource (adding 
one more animal) as small and con-
stant, and much less than the private 
benefits (from selling an animal). 
However, the overall cost to all the 
users of each additional resource unit 
consumed (animal added) increases 
exponentially as the resource is 
stressed. Eventually, one additional 
animal (which costs its owner no 
more than the first) leads to the de-
struction of the resource (which costs 
the animal's owner and the rest of the 
ranchers tremendously). The tragedy 
of the commons is a collective trap 
that occurs because the costs and 
benefits apparent to the individual are 
inconsistent with the costs and bene-
fits to the collective society. 
Edney and Harper (1978) experi-
June 1987 
Table 1. A short taxonomy of social traps (Cross and Guyer 1980). 







men ted with a simple game designed 
to test people's behavior in a com-
mons game. In this game a pool of 
resources is represented by poker 
chips. The resource pool is renew-
able; it is replenished after each round 
in proportion to the number of chips 
left in the common pool. The objec-
tive for each player is to accumulate 
as many chips as possible from the 
common pool. At each round, players 
can take either one, two, or three 
chips. If all players take three chips 
per round, the resource pool is quick-
ly depleted, and the players end up 
with far fewer chips than if they had 
all taken only one chip per round, 
since doing so would have allowed 
the resource pool to replenish itself. 
This game is a trap (and a good 
analogy for many real-world com-
mon-property resource problems) be-
cause the short-term, narrow incen-
tives (to take as many chips as 
possible each round) are inconsistent 
with the long-term incentives (to ac-
cumulate as many chips as possible by 
the end of the game). 
Escaping social traps 
Cross and Guyer (1980) list four 
broad methods by which traps can be 
avoided or escaped. These are educa-
tion (about the long-term, distributed 
impacts); insurance; superordinate 
authority (i.e., legal systems, govern-
ment, and religion); and converting 
the trap to a trade-off (i.e., correcting 
the road signs). Figures 1b-1d illus-
trate these methods using the road 
sign analogy. 
Education can be used to warn 
people of long-term impacts that can-
not be seen from the road (Figure 1b). 
Examples are the warning labels now 
required on cigarette packages and 
the warnings of environmentalists 
about future hazardous waste prob-
lems. People can ignore warnings, 
however, particularly if the path 
Examples 
Discounting, smoking, drug addiction in general 
Slot machines, gambler'S fallacy 
Pesticide overuse 
Pollution, prisoner's dilemma 
Tragedy of the commons 
seems otherwise enticing (e.g., warn-
ing labels on cigarette packages have 
had little effect on the number of 
smokers). 
The main problem with education 
as a general method of avoiding and 
escaping traps is that it requires a 
significant time commitment on the 
part of individuals to learn the details 
of each situation. Our current society 
is so large and complex that we can-
not expect even environmental pro-
fessionals, much less the entire voting 
public, to know the details of all the 
extant environmental traps. For edu-
cation to be effective in avoiding traps 
involving many individuals, all the 
participants must be educated. For 
example, in the renewable resource 
game mentioned earlier if anyone of 
the players starts taking three chips 
per round the others must follow suit. 
If anyone player consumes three 
chips per round, the other players will 
do individually worse by restricting 
their consumption to one per round 
than if they consume three per round. 
The trap can only be avoided if all the 
players restrict their consumption to 
one chip per round, which requires 
that they all are educated about the 
nature of the trap. 
The superordinate authority ap-
proach to avoiding social traps is 
illustrated in Figure 1c. Governments 
can forbid or regulate certain actions 
that have been deemed socially inap-
propriate. The problem with this ap-
proach is that it must be rigidly moni-
tored and enforced, and the strong 
short-term incentive for individuals to 
try to ignore or avoid the regulations 
remains. A police force and legal sys-
tem are very expensive to maintain, 
and increasing their chances of catch-
ing violators increases their costs ex-
ponentially (both the costs of main-
taining a larger, better-equipped force 
and the cost of the loss of individual 
privacy). 
Religion can be seen as a much less 
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expensive way to avoid certain social 
traps. If a moral code of action and 
belief in an ultimate payment for 
transgressions can be deeply instilled 
in a person, the probability of that 
person's falling into the "sins" (traps) 
covered by the code will be greatly 
reduced, and with very little enforce-
ment cost. On the other hand, there 
are problems with religion as a means 
to avoid social traps. The moral code 
must be relatively static to allow be-
liefs learned early in life to remain in 
force later. And it requires a relatively 
homogeneous community of like-
minded believers for religion to be 
truly effective. This system works well 
in culturally homogeneous societies 
that are changing very slowly. In 
modern, heterogeneous, rapidly 
changing societies, religion cannot 
handle all the newly evolving situa-
tions, nor the conflict between radi-
cally different cultures and belief 
systems. 
A trap may be changed to a trade-
off by imposing compensatory fees 
(Figure 1d). Many theorists believe 
that this method is the most effective 
in avoiding and escaping from social 
traps because it does not run counter 
to our normal tendency to follow the 
road signs; it merely corrects the 
signs' inaccuracies by adding com-
pensatory positive or negative 
reinforcements. 
A simple example illustrates how 
effective this method can be. Playing 
slot machines is a social trap because 
the long-term costs and benefits are 
inconsistent with the short-term costs 
and benefits (Cross and Guyer 1980). 
People play the machines because 
they expect a large short-term jack-
pot, while the machines are in fact 
programmed to payoff, say, $0.80 on 
the dollar in the long term. People 
may "win" hundreds of dollars play-
ing the slots in the short run, but if 
they play long enough they will cer-
tainly lose $0.20 for every dollar 
played. To change this trap to a trade-
off, one could simply reprogram the 
machines so that every time a dollar 
was put in $0.80 would come out. 
This way the short-term reinforce-
ments ($0.80 on the dollar) are made 
consistent with the long-term rein-
forcements ($0.80 on the dollar), and 
only the dedicated aficionados of 
spinning wheels with fruit painted on 
them would continue to play. 
410 
In terms of Edney and Harper's 
common property resource consump-
tion game, one could turn the trap 
into a trade-off by taxing any con-
sumption above the optimum level 
for resource stability. For example, if 
players took two or three chips they 
could be taxed one or two chips re-
spectively, so that the short-term 
benefits of taking more than one chip 
were offset by short-term costs. This 
would remove the short-term incen-
tive to take more than one chip and 
make the long- and short-term incen-
tives in the game consistent, thereby 
eliminating the trap. 
Traps and 
environmental policy 
Our approach in the United States to 
avoiding and escaping environmental 
traps has been mainly education and 
governmental regulation (Figures 1b 
and 1c). Although these methods are 
essential elements in the overall pic-
ture, they may not be the most effec-
tive means available in some situa-
tions. Converting traps to trade-offs 
seems to be a more effective method 
in many experimental trap situations, 
but it has been little used in the 
environmental area. In terms of envi-
ronmental management, converting 
traps to trade-offs implies determin-
ing the long-run, distributed costs of 
environmentally hazardous activities 
and charging those costs to the re-
sponsible parties in the short run. 
Pollution taxes are the best-known 
example of this approach (and they 
have been quite effective in the few 
cases in which they have been tried), 
but it is possible to extend it to a 
much broader range of environmental 
problems. Below I give examples of 
how this approach might be applied 
to three critical current problems: 
hazardous waste management, coast-
al wetland management, and the nu-
clear arms race. I do not imply that 
this approach should be used inde-
pendently of education, insurance, 
and regulation, but as an adjunct that 
can make the entire system more 
effective. 
Hazardous waste management 
The hazardous waste management 
problem can be viewed as a hybrid 
trap containing elements of time-de-
lay, ignorance, externality, and col-
lective traps. The negative environ-
mental effects of hazardous waste do 
not become evident until long after 
they are produced (time delay); their 
ultimate effects are largely unknown 
at the time of their production and 
release into the environment (igno-
rance); the negative effects are borne 
by parties other than the producer 
without sufficient compensation (ex-
ternality); and common property re-
sources are consumed (i.e., ground-
water contamination) by individual 
agents who do not bear the costs of 
that consumption. The current regu-
latory approaches to hazardous waste 
management will not be discussed 
here. 
To turn this trap into a trade-off 
one must charge the producers of 
hazardous waste for the ultimate 
long-run environmental and health 
costs of these wastes, and the charges 
must be imposed at the time of the 
waste's production. Superfund can be 
seen as a small step in the right direc-
tion, but it relates only to the cleanup 
of abandoned hazardous waste sites, 
is assessed long after the wastes are 
produced, and is severely underfund-
ed for the task. 
The ignorance component of the 
hazardous waste management trap is 
the most difficult to deal with. How 
can we charge producers of hazard-
ous wastes for the ultimate long-run 
costs of their waste if we have no idea 
what (if any) those costs will actually 
be? Part of the problem is that this 
ignorance and uncertainty about fu-
ture costs is itself a cost, or more 
precisely a risk of unknown magni-
tude. The trap exists in large part 
because the producers of the hazard-
ous waste do not bear this risk in the 
short-run, but pass it on to the gener-
al population and future generations. 
One way to solve this problem in-
volves changing our concepts of inno-
cence and guilt as they apply to indus-
trial products. As in our criminal 
justice system, there is currently a 
tacit presumption of "innocent until 
proven guilty" for chronic effects, 
particularly those that are difficult to 
quantify. The effect of smoking on 
lung cancer is a case in point; ciga-
rettes had been presumed innocent 
until the overwhelming weight of evi-
dence proved them guilty. Although 
such presumption of innocence is to-
BioScience Vol. 37 No.6 
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tally appropriate for persons charged 
with crimes, it is not appropriate for 
hazardous or potentially hazardous 
materials, which we should instead 
presume guilty until proven innocent. 
Thus, to turn the hazardous waste 
trap into a trade-off, we could charge 
producers of potentially harmful sub-
stances the worst-case costs. By 
worst-case we mean our current best 
estimate of the largest potential dam-
ages, although future information 
may later be used to increase the 
worst-case costs. This money could 
be put into a trust fund that would be 
returned to the producer (with inter-
est) if and when the waste is proved to 
be innocuous, or could be used to 
compensate for damages caused by 
the waste if and when they become 
apparent. This procedure would 
change the short-term incentive struc-
ture from one that discourages waste 
producers from doing research on 
harmful effects, to one that encour-
ages these studies so that some of the 
trust fund monies could be returned. 
The incentives to eliminate ignorance 
about hazardous waste effects would 
increase. It would also discourage 
production of large quantities of 
chemicals whose negative effects are 
unknown by making them as expen-
sive in the short run as their risk cost 
to society. 
Coastal wetland management 
The problem of coastal wetland man-
agement is another example of a com-
plex hybrid trap, with time-delay, ig-
norance, and collective elements. 
Coastal erosion in Louisiana is a par-
ticularly severe example. Canal 
dredging and other hydrologically 
disruptive activities have contributed 
to a current land loss rate of over 100 
km2/yr (Craig et al. 1979, Gagliano et 
al. 1981, Scaife et al. 1983). It may 
already be too late to arrest or reverse 
this trend. The situation is a trap 
because the narrow, short-term incen-
tives of those damaging the wetlands 
are inconsistent with the long-term 
good of the system. 
To turn this trap into a trade-off, 
one should charge the responsible 
parties, at the time the damage-caus-
ing action is taken, the full cost of the 
ultimate environmental damage. To 
do this one needs to know the eco-
nomic value to society of coastal 
June 1987 
marshes and the amount of marsh 
destroyed by each activity. As with 
the hazardous waste issue, there is 
much uncertainty involved in these 
estimates, but the worst-case costs 
should be assumed, and the burden of 
proof that the damages are in fact less 
than the worst case should be shifted 
to the parties who caused the damage. 
In addition, there needs to be a system 
for reducing the costs in proportion 
to any reduction in damages below 
the worst case. 
For example, a recent study con-
cluded that each acre of coastal wet-
lands in Louisiana has a present value 
to society of approximately $2500-
$10,000/acre (Farber and Costanza 
1987). Increasing the accuracy of the 
valuation estimates is an expensive 
proposition, and one that would 
stress the state's research budget. 
To effectively eliminate this trap, 
one could charge the parties responsi-
ble for marsh destruction (i.e., oil 
companies for dredging access canals 
through wetlands) the $10,000/acre 
worst-case cost. These fees would go 
into a trust fund to be used for miti-
gating environmental damages by 
purchasing marshland elsewhere, 
backfilling canals, and diverting sedi-
ments. The responsible parties could 
lower the fee by proving that the 
damages are actually less than the 
worst-case assumption (by funding 
independent studies) or by minimiz-
ing the amount of wetlands they dam-
age in the process of accomplishing 
their goal (e.g., by directional drilling 
or immediate backfilling). In either 
case the cause of wetland conserva-
tion would be served without unduly 
hindering the search for oil and gas. 
The arms race and the dollar 
auction game 
The current arms buildup is an envi-
ronmental issue both because of its 
ongoing resource use and its potential 
for massive environmental destruc-
tion in the event of a major war 
(Mosley 1985, Sivard 1984, Wallace 
et al. 1986). Gradual despoilation of 
the environment by more convention-
al means is certainly preferable to 
destroying it all at once in a nuclear 
war, but both must be included in any 
litany of major environmental 
problems. 
The arms race has been escalating 
for the last 40 years and threatens to 
continue on this course with new 
developments, such as the Strategic 
Defense Initiative. It can be argued 
that the costs and risks of the arms 
race far outweigh its benefits, yet the 
process continues with no sign of 
abatement. 
One simple but enlightening model 
for the study of the escalation process 
is known as the dollar auction game. 
This game is a social trap that was 
designed specifically to simulate con-
flict escalation (Shubik 1971). The 
dollar auction is just like a normal 
auction except that both the highest 
and the second-highest bidder have to 
pay the auctioneer their bid at the end 
of the game, but only the highest 
bidder gets the prize. This rule leads 
to some unexpected behavior that is a 
useful model of the arms race. Players 
in the dollar auction game frequently 
bid much more than $1 for a $1 
prize-an irrational result that is the 
product of a series of "rational" deci-
sions by the bidders, because the 
structure of reinforcements in this 
game is a trap. If player A had bid $1 
and player B had the second-highest 
bid at $0.95, player B reasons that if 
he drops out he loses $0.95 while if he 
raises to $1.05 he only loses $0.05 
(assuming he wins the $1 prize). So he 
usually raises, and this pattern of 
"rational" escalation (beyond the 
point where the overall outcome is 
rational) continues quite often to well 
beyond the $1 point. Individual and 
group behavior in the dollar auction 
game has been extensively studied by 
Teger (1980). 
The dollar auction game can be 
converted to a trade-off by adding a 
"bidding tax" large enough to make 
dropping out rational in both the 
short run and the long run (Costanza 
1984, 1986). For example, if when 
player B was at $0.95 he was told that 
it would now cost $2 to enter a bid of 
$1.05 (a $0.95 bidding tax), he would 
reason that if he drops out he loses 
$0.95, but if he raises he loses $1 even 
if he wins the prize! So the chances 
that he would drop out and escape 
the trap are increased. This method 
has proven to be effective in experi-
ments using the dollar auction game 
(Costanza 1986). Extrapolating these 
ideas to controlling the escalation of 
the arms race is tricky, but it is possi-
ble that a nuclear weapons tax (which 
411 
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has already been proposed as a meth-
od to fund Third World development) 
may prove to be an effective control 
method (Costanza 1984, 1986, UN 
1982). 
Conclusions 
Social traps are one way of generating 
those situations in which the short-
term, local optimizing of individuals 
goes afoul. In this sense they indicate 
imperfections in the free market ap-
proach to resource allocation, which 
relies on short-term, local optimizing 
of individuals. It can be argued that 
the proper role of a democratic gov-
ernment is to eliminate social traps 
(no more and no less) while maintain-
ing as much individual freedom as 
possible. This can be accomplished 
most effectively by turning the traps 
into trade-offs that can be handled 
within the current market system as 
modifications to the cost of potential-
ly entrapping activities. 
Social traps abound in environmen-
tal issues because of the abundance of 
imperfectly owned and common 
property resources. To turn these 
traps into trade-offs, we must calcu-
late the long-term social cost of activi-
ties with environmental impacts and 
charge those costs to the responsible 
parties in the short run. If there are 
any uncertainties about the magni-
tude of these social costs, the worst 
case should be assumed, and the bur-
den of proving that costs are actually 
less than this should fall on the parties 
responsible for the impact, not the 
general public. It is also critical that 
short-term incentives for reducing en-
vironmental costs (by reducing the 
charges) be included. We must make 
protecting the environment as eco-
nomically attractive to individuals in 
412 
the short run as it is to society in the 
long run. 
All animals capable of choice can 
be trapped with the right bait. Intelli-
gent ones can learn to avoid traps. 
Ingenious ones can even escape from 
traps. If we are to survive, we need to 
exercise our vaunted intelligence and 
ingenuity to see, avoid, and escape 
from the many complex traps we 
have laid for ourselves. 
Acknowledgments 
This research was supported in part 
by a Kellogg National Fellowship. J. 
Bartholomew, H. E. Daly, B. Han-
non, and G. Suter provided useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this 
article. Special thanks to E. Chu for 
her help. This paper evolved from a 
presentation at the 1985 AIBS annual 
meeting in Gainesville, FL. 
References cited 
Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooper-
ation. Basic Books, New York. 
Brockner, J., and J. Z. Rubin. 1985. Entrap-
ment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psy-
chological Analysis. Springer-Verlag, New 
York. 
Catton, W. R., Jr. 1987. The world's most 
polymorphic species. BioScience 37: 413-
419. 
Costanza, R. 1984. The nuclear arms race and 
the theory of social traps. J. Peace Res. 21: 
79-86. 
__ . 1986. Understanding and controlling 
the conflict escalation process and the nucle-
ar arms race: experiments with the dollar 
auction game. Pages 237-257 in J. P. Maas 
and R. A. C. Stewart, eds. Toward a WOf 
of Peace: People Create Alternatives. Tie 
University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. 
Craig, N. J., R. E. Turner, and J. W. Day, Jr. 
1979. Land loss in coastal Louisiana. Envi-
ron. Manage. 3: 133-144. 
Cross, J. G., and M. J. Guyer. 1280. SOCIal 
Traps. University of Michigan Press, "'nn 
Arbor. 
Deegan, L. A., H. M. Kennedy, and C. Neill. 
1984. Natural factors and human modifica-
tions contributing to marsh loss in Louisi-
ana's Mississippi River deltaic plain. Envi-
ron. Manage. 8: 519-528. 
Edney, J. J., and C. Harper. 1978. The effects 
of information in a resource management 
problem: a social trap analog. Hum. Ecol. 6: 
387-395. 
Ehrlich, P. R. et al. 1983. Long-term biological 
consequences of nuclear war. Science 222: 
1293-1300. 
Farber, S., and R. Costanza. 1987. The eco-
nomic value of wetland ecosystems. J. Envi-
ron. Manage. in press. 
Gagliano, S. M., K. J. Meyer-Arendt, and 
K. M. Wicker. 1981. Land loss in the Missis-
sippi River deltaic plain. Trans. Gulf Coast 
Assoc. Geol. Soc. 31: 295-299. 
Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. 
Science 162: 1243-1248. 
Leibowitz, S. G., F. H. Sklar, and R. Costanza. 
1987. Perspectives on Louisiana land loss 
modeling. In R. R. Sharitz and J. W. Gib-
bons, eds. Freshwater Wetlands and Wildlife, 
In press. 
Mosley, H. G. 1985. The Arms Race: Econom-
ic and Social Consequences. Lexington 
Books, Lexington, MA. 
Platt, J. 1973. Social traps. Am. Psychol. 28: 
642-651. 
Scaife, W. W., R. E. Turner, and R. Costanza. 
1983. Coastal Louisiana recent land loss and 
canal impacts. Environ. Manage. 7: 433-
442. 
Shubik, M. 1971. The dollar auction game: a 
paradox in noncooperative behavior and es-
calation. J. Conflict Resolution 15: 109-
111. 
Sivard, R. L. 1984. World Military and Social 
Expenditures. World Priorities, Leesburg, VA. 
Teger, A. I. 1980. Too Much Invested to Quit. 
Pergamon Press, New York. 
Turco, R. P., O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. 
Pollack, and C. Sagan. 1983. Nuclear winter: 
global consequences of multiple nuclear ex-
plosions. Science 222: 1293-1330. 
United Nations (UN). 1982. The Relationship 
Between Disarmament and Development. 
United Nations Centre for Disarmament, 
Report ~f the Secretary-General, New York. 
Wallace, .M. D., B. L. Crissey, and L. I. Sennott. 
1986. Accidental nuclear war: a risk assess-
ment. J. Peace. Res. 23: 9-27. 
White, G. F., and J. London, eds. 1984. The' 
Environmental Effects of Nuclear War. West-
view Press, Boulder, CO. 
BioScience Vol. 37 No.6 
